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ABSTRACT 
 
Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) causes seasonal depression in a part of the population 
in several countries. It presents itself, when daylight hours decrease and has been found 
to be more prevalent, when moving away from the equator. This thesis examines the 
implications and inefficiencies the disorder may cause on some of the northernmost stock 
markets, the stock markets of the Nordic countries. The topic is approached from the 
perspectives of efficient markets and behavioral finance. The efficient market part 
presents the principles of asset pricing on efficient markets. In the behavioral finance part, 
the irrational behavior of investors is explained through psychological biases. The chapter 
also introduces the concept of limits to arbitrage and four anomalies that are connected to 
the SAD phenomenon. 
  
In the empirical part, a regression is run for large cap and small cap indices from Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Large cap and small cap indices are examined separately 
to find out, if SAD affects large and small companies differently. Iceland is studied as 
comparison to these countries, because the prevalence of SAD is especially low there 
regardless of its extremely northern location. Daily returns of these indices are regressed 
on a SAD variable, which measures the length of night at a certain latitude, and a fall 
dummy, which allows the effect of SAD to be asymmetrical. A tax-loss dummy and a 
Monday dummy are used as additional explanatory variables. 
 
A statistically significant SAD effect is found in all other indices, but the Danish small 
cap index and the Icelandic All Share index. The effect is asymmetrical for all indices 
excluding the Finnish large cap index. This means that the effect shifts returns from fall 
to winter. The coefficients for SAD are quite consistent for the large cap indices, varying 
from 0,025 % in Norway to 0,022 % in Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The consistency 
of the coefficients is lower for small cap indices, ranging from 0,028 % in Sweden to 
0,014 % in Finland. Based on these results, no claim can be made about small cap 
companies experiencing a larger SAD effect or vice versa. 
 
KEY WORDS: Seasonal Affective Disorder, Stock Returns, Efficient Markets, 
Behavioral Finance, Stock Market Anomalies 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) is a medical condition with psychological and 
physiological symptoms. It presents itself during the winter season, when daylight hours 
decrease. It causes depression and anxiety to a part of a population. (Avery, Eder, Bolte, 
Hellekson et al. 2001.) At the same time depression and anxiety have been linked to lower 
risk-taking in financial as well as other matters (Kamstra, Kramer & Levi 2003). This 
might mean that on stock markets affected by SAD, expected returns are higher, when 
the level of risk-aversion lowers. 
 
SAD has been found to be more prevalent in higher latitudes (Magnusson 2000). This 
suggests that the prevalence of SAD would be higher than average in Nordic countries. 
Therefore, if SAD has an effect on stock markets, the effect should be observable in the 
markets of Nordic countries. There is also evidence of smaller companies being more 
locally owned (see for example Grinblatt & Keloharju 2001 and Ivkovic & Weisbenner 
2005.) Therefore, it would be logical to assume that the SAD effect would be stronger in 
smaller companies. 
 
A thorough search of relevant literature yielded no results concerning differences in the 
effect of SAD between large cap and small cap companies. This makes examining large 
cap indices and small cap indices separately especially interesting. Furthermore, the stock 
exchanges of the Nordic countries are all among the northernmost stock exchanges of the 
world, and therefore the changes in length of night are among the most extreme of cities 
with stock exchanges. On the darkest day of the year, the sun can be seen for less than 
seven hours in Copenhagen, less than six hours in Stockholm and approximately five and 
a half hours in Oslo and Helsinki. In the city with the northernmost stock exchange in the 
world, Reykjavik, the sun can be seen for less than three and a half hours. 
 
The concept of SAD affecting stock returns through changes in risk aversion has been 
somewhat controversial (see for example Jacobsen & Marquering 2008, Jacobsen & 
Marquering 2009 and Keef & Khaleed 2011). Therefore additional research concerning 
the effect is called for. Studying the phenomenon in northern stock exchanges far from 
the equator, where the effect should be most pronounced, seems very interesting. The new 
dimension of comparing the effect between large cap and small cap indices should also 
provide some interesting results and fresh points of view.   
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1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
According to the efficient market hypothesis created by Fama (1970) no seasonal 
irregularities should be observable on stock markets in the long run. However, several 
studies have been made concerning different seasonal patterns on stock markets. Some of 
these calendar anomalies, like the January effect, have been studied exhaustively for 
several decades and in several countries (see for example Kato & Schallheim 1985, 
Bhardwaj & Brooks 1992 and Gu 2003). Others, like the SAD phenomenon, are relatively 
new and therefore less research has been made on them. While more anomalies are 
discovered, many of them start to overlap. For this reason the anomalies that most clearly 
overlap with the SAD-phenomenon are discussed in this study. 
 
This thesis attempts to find out, if a SAD effect exists on stock markets of Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The large cap indices of each country are compared to 
small cap indices to find out if the SAD-effect is more pronounced in smaller companies. 
The method used in this thesis is regression analysis. 
 
Along with the aforementioned Nordic countries, the SAD-effect in the Icelandic stock 
market is studied as an interesting comparison. Although Reykjavik is the northernmost 
stock exchange in the world, especially strong SAD-effect cannot be expected, because 
the prevalence of SAD in Iceland is relatively low, 3,80 %. This is significantly lower 
than the prevalence measured by the same methods in east cost of the United States, which 
is closer to the equator. (Magnusson & Stefansson 1993.) 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter one introduces briefly the topic and the 
research problem. The second chapter introduces the traditional way of thinking about 
finance, along with some basic concepts. The principles of efficient markets are covered 
through the efficient market hypothesis. It also explains the relationship of risk and return 
and presents two basic asset pricing models. These principles are explained, because SAD 
affecting stock returns argues with them profoundly.  
 
In the third chapter a behavioral way to study finance is presented. Reader is steered 
towards a psychological way of thinking about finance. The chapter explains the 
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foundations of behavioral finance, which are psychology and limits to arbitrage. In the 
end of the third chapter, anomalies, which are phenomena that should not exist in efficient 
markets, are discussed and some behavioral viewpoints and explanations are offered. 
 
The fourth chapter reviews the literature concerning the seasonal affective disorder more 
profoundly. It presents physical and psychological proof of the phenomenon using 
medical research. Later in the chapter financial research is examined and the effect of the 
SAD phenomenon to the stock and other markets is discussed. Different results from 
several markets are compared and commented. 
 
Chapter five begins the empirical part of the thesis. It describes the data, hypotheses and 
methods used. The sixth chapter presents and discusses the results of the regressions. The 
final chapter, chapter seven, draws conclusions. It goes over the most important findings 
of the thesis and links them to the research problem. Finally, some interesting extending 
research topics are presented.  
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2. EFFICIENT MARKETS 
 
 
There are many descriptions of the role of financial markets. Fama (1970) states that the 
primary role of capital markets is to allocate ownership of the economy’s capital stock. 
According to Knüpfer & Puttonen (2009: 50), the four main functions of financial markets 
are: 
 
1. Efficient allocation of funds between surplus and shortfall sectors. On efficient markets 
there are no trading costs and taxes. 
 
2. Providing information. Investors have the latest information of the characteristics, risks 
and returns of their investments. Prices contain information about the expectations of the 
market as a whole. 
 
3. Improving liquidity of assets. On liquid markets investors can realize their financial 
assets. For example, if an investor buys a corporate bond, he/she does not have to hold 
the bond for its whole maturity. He/she has the opportunity to sell it to other investors on 
the financial market. This makes lending and borrowing easier, because both sides can 
have maturities of their choosing. 
 
4. Diversification of risk. An investor has the opportunity to invest in different companies 
and asset classes. Through an investment fund an investor can achieve a broad 
diversification with relatively low costs. 
 
This research studies the effects of the SAD-phenomenon in all four of these functions as 
well as its relation to efficient markets, which are discussed in the subchapter 2.1.  
 
 
2.1. The efficient market hypothesis 
 
The traditional financial theories are based on the assumption of efficient capital markets. 
Fama (1970) presents three forms of market efficiency: 
 
1. Weak form: Market prices reflect the information embedded in past prices. If this form 
holds, it is not possible to earn constant excess profits based on analysis of past returns. 
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2. Semi-strong form: Market prices reflect all publicly available information. If this form 
holds, prices adjust immediately to public information and it is not possible to earn 
constant excess profits by analyzing, for example, earnings announcements or merger 
proposals. 
 
3. Strong form: Market prices reflect all information, including insider information. It is 
not possible to earn constant excess profits on a strong form efficient market. 
 
The hypothesis assumes that there are no transaction costs or informational imperfections 
on the market. It is easy to observe that this is not the case on real markets. This, however, 
doesn’t mean that the market is necessarily inefficient. Only, if there are investors, who 
can constantly make better evaluations of the available information and earn excess 
profits from the markets, can one describe the markets inefficient (Fama 1970). 
 
The critique towards efficient market hypothesis often questions the rationality of traders. 
According to the hypothesis, market participants are rational and they make trades to 
maximize their wealth the way financial models suggest. If an irrational trader would 
make a too optimistic buy, rational investors would sell and eliminate the effect. 
However, according to Shiller (2003), it is in no way clear that rational investors would 
have the power or the willingness to drive prices towards fundamentals. He defines smart 
money as investors, who have the ability to solve complex theoretical optimization 
models. Smart money has even been documented to amplify the effect of irrational traders 
(De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann 1990). The “rational” traders have acted 
“irrationally” and anticipated a price increase caused by irrational investors.  
 
If it is possible to earn constant excess profits with a SAD based strategy, even the weak 
form of market efficiency fails to hold. The market participants, who are affected by SAD, 
would be acting irrationally. However, Fama (1991) states that it is not necessarily against 
market efficiency for expected returns to vary over time. If the variation of expected 
returns can be predicted by a financial model, the actions of investors might be defined 
rational. A model that allows risk aversion to vary over time is presented later in this 
chapter. 
 
 
2.2. Risk and return 
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Risk and return have a fundamental connection on financial markets. The riskier an asset, 
the higher the return demanded by investors. Risk of an investment can be measured by 
volatility. Volatility of an asset means the standard deviation of its returns during a certain 
period of time. It can be calculated from daily, weekly, monthly or yearly data. (Knüpfer 
et al. 2009: 132–133). 
Figure 1. The relationship of systematic and unsystematic risk. (Knüpfer et al. 2009: 144) 
 
 
Volatility measures the total risk of an investment. It can be divided into systematic risk 
and nonsystematic risk. Systematic risk is the part of total risk that affects the whole 
market. Sources of systematic risk include inflation, exchange rates and interest rates. 
Unsystematic risk is the firm specific part of total risk. It consists of the uncertainty and 
surprises concerning the company in question. The amount of unsystematic risk can be 
controlled by diversifying the investments of a portfolio. Systematic risk can be 
considered more important, because one cannot get rid of it through diversification. 
(Knüpfer et al. 2009: 146–147.) The relationship of systematic and unsystematic risk is 
presented in figure 1. 
 
The systematic risk of a stock can be measured by beta. Beta presents the sensitivity of 
an individual stock to changes in the market portfolio (Knüpfer et al. 2009: 146). 
Unsystematic risk 
Number of different assets 
Portfolio variance 
Systematic risk 
15 
 
According to Knüpfer et al. (2009: 146–147), it can be calculated mathematically as 
follows: 
 
(1) βi = COVi,m/σ2m   
 
Where, βi = the beta coefficient of security i 
COVi,m = the covariance between the returns of security i and the market 
portfolio 
  σ2m = the variance of the return of the market portfolio 
 
Investors can be rational, even though they do not maximize their risk adjusted returns. 
Instead, they maximize their utility, which is a result of the investments expected risk and 
return and their personal preferences. The personal preference of an investor is called 
his/her rate of risk aversion. Risk averse investors prefer certainty to higher returns to a 
certain degree. (Bodie et al. 2009: 162–163.) Figure 2 presents the utility functions of a 
risk lover, risk averter and a risk neutral investor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 2. The utility functions of a risk lover, a risk neutral and a risk averter (Copeland, Weston 
& Shastri 2005: 53). 
 
 
Merton (1980) presents a measure for investors relative risk aversion. He introduces this 
measure as λ. This measure is discussed more thoroughly as a part of the conditional 
Capital Asset Pricing -model presented in subchapter 2.3.1. The idea behind the SAD 
phenomenon is that risk aversion λ could vary through time and especially through 
seasons. 
 
 
Risk neutral Wealth 
Utility 
Wealth 
Utility 
Wealth 
Utility 
Risk lover Risk averter 
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2.3. Asset pricing models 
 
Of the several financial models found in financial theory, this thesis concentrates on two 
market equilibrium models. These models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). According to Copeland et al. (2005: 147–148) these 
models determine the market price for risk and the measure of risk for a single asset. 
 
These models are presented, because different versions of them are used to measure the 
SAD phenomenon in concerning research. The models and their different versions 
overlap, but at the same time they have differences in factors that explain returns 
(Copeland et al. 2005: 147). 
 
2.3.1. CAP-model 
 
The CAPM is used to calculate the expected return of a security in a simplified world. It 
is based on modern portfolio theory and was developed in articles by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). The model makes several assumptions that do not hold 
in the real world. Despite its shortcomings, it is widely used and its accuracy is deemed 
acceptable. (Bodie et al. 2011: 281–282.) 
 
According to Bodie et al. (2011: 295) The CAPM can be presented mathematically as 
follows: 
 
(2) E(ri)=rf+βi[E(rm)-rf]   
 
Where: E(ri) = Expected return of security i  
 rf = Risk-free rate 
 βi = Beta coefficient of security i 
 E(rm) = Expected return of the market portfolio 
 
This version of the CAPM presents the relationship of the expected return of a security 
to the expected return of the market. Fama & French (1993) introduced an extension to 
the CAPM. This multifactor model consists of three factors, which are an overall market 
factor such as found in the traditional CAPM, a size factor (small minus big, SMB) and a 
book-to-market factor (high book-to-market minus small book-to-market, HML). Fama 
& French (1996) find that the multifactor model has more explanatory power than the 
traditional CAPM. However, they recognize that it does not work universally.  
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According to Campbell & Cochrane (2000), asset pricing models that take time-varying 
information into account, are likely to perform better than models that are constant in 
time. Bekaert & Harvey (1995) test a conditional CAPM presented originally by Merton 
(1980). This model treats the measure of risk aversion λ as a conditionally expected price 
of covariance risk. This model also allows time variation in the price of risk. The risk free 
rate is not a component of the model, because the return is determined at t-1. 
 
Pricing of security A can be presented with the model mathematically as follows (Bekaert 
et al. 1995): 
 
(3) Et-1(r
A
i,t) = λi,t-1covt-1(rAi,t, ri,t)  
 
Where, Et-1(r
A
i,t) = conditionally expected excess return on security A in country i 
on time t, 
λi,t-1 = conditionally expected price of covariance risk in country i on time 
t, 
 ri,t = return on the market portfolio of country i on time t, 
 covt-1 = conditional covariance operator. 
 
On a national level the model simplifies to (Bekaert et al. 1995): 
 
(4) Et-1(ri,t) = λi,t-1vart-1(ri,t)   
 
This is basically the same model as model number three. The difference is that the 
covariance between security A and the market portfolio becomes variance, because the 
model describes the whole market of a country instead of a single security. 
 
2.3.2. Arbitrage pricing theory 
 
APT is a factor model developed by Ross (1976). APT relies on three assumptions. First, 
security returns can be described by a factor model. Second, there are enough securities 
to diversify unsystematic risk away. Third, markets will not allow arbitrage opportunities 
to persist. (Bodie et al. 2009: 323–324.) 
 
According to Copeland et al. (2005: 176) APT can be presented mathematically as 
follows: 
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(5) Ri = E(Ri) + bi1F1 + … + bikFk + ϵi 
 
Where, Ri = the random rate of return of the ith asset, 
 E(Ri) = the expected rate of return of the ith asset, 
 bik = the sensitivity of the return of the ith asset to the kth factor, 
 Fk = the mean zero kth factor common to the returns of all assets, 
 ϵi = a random zero mean noise term for the ith asset. 
 
APT consists of several undetermined factors. These factors can be for example interest 
rates or the growth rate of the gross domestic product. Because firm specific risk is 
diversifiable, the factors are macroeconomic. (Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2008: 
76–78.) The CAPM and the multifactor model presented by Fama et al. (1993) are 
actually just APT with determined factors. 
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3. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
 
Lead by Fama (1970), efficient markets dominated the academic studies of finance in the 
1970s. It was later realized that following the efficient market theory rigorously could 
lead to major misinterpretations of financial situations such as stock market bubbles 
(Shiller 2003). According to Shiller (2003), theoretical efficient market models should 
not be trusted blindly on real markets. The debate between behavioral finance and 
efficient markets is still alive today (see for example Kim, Shamshuddin & Lim 2013 and 
McMillan & Wohar 2013). 
 
Behavioral finance can be approached in different ways. Shleifer & Summers (1990) 
treated it as an alternative to the efficient markets approach. Many modern textbooks 
consider it as an add-on to classic finance (see for example Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011). 
According to Shiller (2003), behavioral finance studies finance from a social science 
perspective including psychological and sociological dimensions. These different ways 
to approach behavioral finance do not conflict with each other. However, they all have 
fundamental contradictions with the efficient market theory. 
 
In this chapter the behavioral way of thinking about finance is explained. After discussing 
the foundations and basic studies of the school of thought, four anomalies are presented. 
These particular anomalies are explained, because they overlap with the SAD 
phenomenon. 
 
 
3.1. Limits to arbitrage and psychology 
 
Shleifer et al. (1990) identify the “two pillars” of behavioral finance, limits to arbitrage 
(also limits of arbitrage) and investor psychology. They contradict the efficient market 
approach by claiming that on real markets riskless arbitrage is extremely rare, or totally 
non-existent. They also argue that investor psychology plays a big part in the price 
formation of securities. 
 
Arbitrage is theoretically an investment strategy that guarantees profits with no risk. 
Perfect arbitrage requires no capital, so arbitrageurs would want to take infinite positions 
until the arbitrage possibility disappears. In practice, however, arbitrage is defined as a 
strategy that exploits market inefficiency. The idea is to buy underpriced and sell 
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overpriced securities to make profits, when prices return to fundamental values. Nothing 
guarantees that prices actually would return to fundamentals on real markets, so this kind 
of trading is almost never risk-free. This creates the limits to arbitrage. (Brealey et. al. 
2011: 356.) 
 
A basic example of a situation with limits to arbitrage is for example the following: 
Consider Nokia-stock, which is traded in the Helsinki stock exchange and the New York 
stock exchange. If the price of the stock is not the same on both markets, one should short 
the higher priced one and buy the lower priced one to arbitrage the situation. However, 
even this basic example of arbitrage is not completely risk-free. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
present two main sources of risk for this kind of situation: 
 
1. There is no guarantee that the prices will converge in the short term. This creates a 
problem, because the investor has to pay interest to the lender on his short position.   
 
2. The two exchanges have different trading hours. The investor might have to cover 
his/her short position outside the trading hours of the market he/she is long in. He/she 
would have to find capital to cover the short position and bear the risk of the possible 
depreciation of his/her long position. 
 
Limits to arbitrage can also be linked to psychology. While capital constraints create a 
“hard” limit to arbitrage possibilities, the fear of the actions of irrational investors create 
a “soft” limit. Arbitrageurs may have sufficient capital and knowledge to arbitrage a 
certain situation. However, it is possible that the misperceptions of irrational traders 
deepen, thus prices will be driven even farther from fundamentals. If the mispricing 
deepens too much, arbitrageurs will be forced to liquidate their positions, when expected 
returns are highest. (Shleifer et al. 1997.)  This creates a situation, where possible 
arbitrageurs are capable of arbitrage, but may be unwilling to take action, because of the 
risk created by irrational traders. 
 
Psychology plays a big role in the price formation of securities. Barberis & Thaler (2003) 
summarize seven psychological biases people have been documented to suffer from, 
when forming expectations. They think these are most interesting from a financial point 
of view. These biases are presented in appendix 1. 
 
All of these biases are a part of human irrationality. From a point of view concerning 
SAD, point two, optimism and wishful thinking, and point seven, availability biases, are 
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the most interesting (appendix 1). SAD-sufferers can be thought to regain their optimism, 
when days begin to lengthen and their rate of risk aversion lowers. When days shorten, 
their rate of risk aversion rises and they move to less risky assets because of their personal 
experiences and feelings rather than the events and realities of the market. 
 
 
3.2. Anomalies 
 
A financial anomaly can be described as a persistent deviation from market efficiency 
(Nikkinen et al. 2008: 86). An anomalous pricing of a security can be thought to be driven 
by investors’ psychological biases instead of real information on the market. According 
to Copeland et al. (2005: 404) anomalies may not be exploitable by investors because of 
transaction costs, but acknowledging them could improve the returns of investors, who 
would trade anyway. 
 
Anomalies are often analyzed in order to understand or even predict them. Novy-Marx 
(2014) studies the abilities of several periodic factors to predict a set of well-known 
market anomalies. These factors include the political party of the US president, global 
warming, a temperature anomaly known as El Niño and different planetary cycles. Some 
of these factors seem quite far-fetched, and Novy-Marx (2014) makes a good point about 
the difficulties of data driven search for factors behind anomalies. He concludes that even 
if an anomaly is statistically significantly explained by some factor, the link between the 
factor and the anomaly should be convincing. 
 
A SAD based explanation for the seasonal variation in stock returns differs from the 
phenomena studied by Novy-Marx (2014) through its extensively studied links to 
depression (see for example Rosenthal 1998 and Magnusson 2000). When depression is 
linked to financial risk aversion (see for example Eisenberg, Baron & Seligman 1998 and 
Kramer & Weber 2012), SAD appears to be a much more plausible predictor of seasonal 
movements in the stock market compared to the factors studied by Novy-Marx (2014). 
 
There are several different groups of anomalies. The SAD effect is a calendar anomaly 
due to its seasonal characteristics. It presents itself on a yearly basis. From the four 
anomalies presented in the next subchapters, January effect and Halloween indicator can 
also be categorized as calendar anomalies. All four anomalies presented below can be 
thought to overlap with the SAD effect. The links between them and the SAD effect are 
examined in chapter 4. 
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3.2.1. Size anomaly 
 
Size anomaly (also small firm effect) is originally found by Banz (1981). He finds that 
small firms have on average greater risk adjusted returns than large firms. Banz (1981) 
also finds that while the effect presents itself in stocks of firms with small market 
capitalization, there are no significant differences in returns between middle-sized or 
large companies. 
 
Fama & French (1992) also find the same effect. They claim that if the effect persists, it 
should be a previously unknown risk factor, which would not contradict the efficient 
market theory. Fama et al. (1993) embed a size factor according to the size anomaly as a 
part of their multifactor model presented in subchapter 2.3.1. They find that the size 
anomaly used as a factor in a multifactor model improves the explanatory power of the 
model.  
 
There are several possible reasons to the size effect. It might be that financial models used 
to test the anomaly are misspecified and small firms entail risk that the models are not 
able to measure. Small firms are also traded less frequently and might thus understate the 
actual risk they entail, at least on short interval data. (Roll 1981.) Nikkinen et al. (2008: 
87) note that the anomaly has grown weaker after its original discovery. 
 
3.2.2. January effect 
 
Rozeff & Kinney (1976) were the first to bring January effect to the attention of modern 
finance. However, it was actually first introduced much earlier by Wachtel (1942). Both 
studies find the stock market to yield abnormal returns on January. January effect is the 
best known financial anomaly and majority of the investment community knows of its 
existence (Haugen & Jorion 1996). 
 
Keim (1983) examines the US stock market from 1963 to 1979 and finds a negative 
correlation between abnormal returns and company size. He also finds this correlation to 
be more significant in January than any other month. According to Keim (1983), almost 
half of the abnormal returns of the size effect are explained by the January effect.  
 
Several explanations for the effect are presented in concerning literature. The two most 
significant of these are the tax-loss selling hypothesis by Wachtel (1942) and the window 
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dressing hypothesis by Haugen & Lakonishok (1988). The first suggests that investors 
sell their losing stocks at the end of the year for tax benefits and buy them back at the 
beginning of the year. The second claims that fund managers sell their risky assets at the 
end of the year to make their funds seem more attractive. They will then also buy back 
risky stocks at the beginning of the year to beat the index. (Moller & Zilca 2008.) 
 
3.2.3. The Halloween indicator 
 
The Halloween indicator (also the Halloween effect or Sell-in-May-effect) is based on 
the old market saying “Sell in May and go away”. The first statistically significant results 
about the existence of the effect are produced by Bouman & Jacobsen (2002). They find 
significantly higher returns on a period from November to April than the remainder of the 
year in 36 of the 37 countries under examination. The abnormal returns are also higher, 
when risk is taken into account. The differences in standard deviations are marginal and 
not significant in any of the examined countries. Bouman et al. (2002) examine several 
different possible explanations for the effect, but the only one they find to have an impact 
is the effect of vacations to trading activity. They suggest that the effect caused by 
vacations might be caused by changes in risk aversion or liquidity constraints. However, 
according to the efficient market theory, arbitrageurs should take advantage of such easily 
predictable behavior.  
 
Jacobsen & Zhang (2012) make a study with all available stock market data. Their data 
is from 108 countries and as long periods as data is available for each country. They find 
statistically significantly higher returns in November-April in 35 countries versus only 
two in May-October. The effect can be found in several developed and emerging markets 
around the world, but the effect is strongest after 1960 in developed Western European 
countries. Overall, their results suggest that the effect has strengthened in recent years.  
 
Because the November-April period includes January, one might think that the January 
effect is at least a part of the explanation behind the Halloween effect. However, Bouman 
et al. (2002) find that after controlling for the January effect abnormal profits can still be 
earned in 14 of the 20 countries, in which both Halloween and January effects are found. 
They also find the Halloween effect on many emerging markets, where there is no 
significant January effect. 
 
The Halloween effect can also be thought to overlap with the SAD effect. While the 
trading strategy formed from the Halloween effect suggests to be long on stocks from 
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November to April, the original SAD-based strategy tested by Kamstra et al. (2003) 
suggests on the northern hemisphere to be long from fall equinox to spring equinox 
(September 22nd  to March 20th). These two periods are relatively close to each other with 
a difference of just a little over a month separating them. They might actually be different 
approaches towards the same seasonal pattern found in stock returns. The conflict 
between the two anomalies is the timing on the southern hemisphere, where, according 
to a SAD-based strategy, one should be long conversely compared to the northern 
hemisphere. 
 
3.2.4. Home Bias 
 
Investors have been proven to weigh their domestic equity markets too heavily in their 
portfolios. This has happened despite the fact that the benefits of international 
diversification have been recognized for decades. (See for example Levy & Haim 1970) 
The amount of research concerning the phenomenon increased in the 1990s. According 
to French & Poterba (1991), investors tend to expect higher returns from their domestic 
markets implied by their portfolio patterns. They also note that this does not seem to stem 
from institutional constraints, but the choices of investors. 
 
Tesar & Werner (1995) extend the topic by documenting a preference not only to 
domestic stock, but to the stock markets of countries with close geographical proximity. 
For example, US investors (in addition to investing too heavily in their domestic market) 
overweight Canadian stocks in their international portfolios. An additional note is that 
investors seem to have a higher transaction rate in the international part of their portfolio 
compared to the domestic part. An explanation might be that investors have, or think they 
have, more information about their local companies compared with foreign companies, 
and therefore change the foreign companies in the portfolio more often. 
 
Alongside with country level biases, home bias is also documented within countries. 
Grinblatt et al. (2001) find that investors, are more likely to invest in companies that have 
their headquarters in close proximity of their home municipalities. They also discover 
that investors, whose native tongue is Finnish, are more likely to invest in companies that 
publish their interim reports in Finnish. They also note that after the language is controlled 
for, investors show a preference towards companies, whose CEOs are of same cultural 
origin. The effect of these preferences is stronger with households and less financially 
savvy institutions compared to financially savvy institutions. This suggests that the bias 
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is driven by retail investors, whose actions cannot always be thought of as rational in an 
efficient market sense.   
 
Ivkovic et al. (2005) find similar results by examining US stocks through the data of 
individual accounts from a large broker. However, they also note that locally biased 
investors earn on average 3,2% higher returns on their local holdings compared to their 
non-local holdings. This would suggest that the anomaly is at least partially driven by 
information asymmetries in favor of investors investing in local companies.   
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4. LITERATURE REVIEW OF SEASONAL AFFECTIVE DISORDER 
 
 
In this chapter the SAD phenomenon is discussed more thoroughly. First, an overview of 
the most important research concerning the phenomenon is presented. Second, a more 
detailed look into physiological and psychological research concerning the disorder is 
taken. Finally, the effects found in previous research are gone over more precisely from 
the point of view of the financial markets. 
 
Risk taking behavior of investors plays a big role in pricing of securities. Seasonal 
affective disorder has been linked to depression, which has been documented to lead to a 
higher level of risk-aversion (Eisenberg et al. 1998). If a part of investors suffer from 
seasonal changes in the level of risk aversion, this can lead to seasonal variation in equity 
returns (Kamstra et al. 2003). 
 
Kamstra et al. (2003) were first to study the possibility of earning excess returns by timing 
the market according to the SAD phenomenon in several different stock markets. They 
claim that SAD sufferers create a seasonal pattern in the stock market by moving into less 
risky assets, when days shorten. The same people would then move back into riskier 
assets, when days begin to lengthen. The basic idea is to be out of the stock market, while 
days shorten and long in the stock market, when the days begin to lengthen. This would 
yield excess returns, if their hypothesis about an increase in the level of risk aversion held.  
 
The results of the research of Kamstra et al. (2003) support their hypothesis. Even after 
controlling for seasonal patterns, like tax-loss-trading and environmental effects, like 
sunshine and temperature, the strategy seemed to yield statistically significantly better 
results than a buy-and-hold-strategy on several markets. The effect was stronger in 
general in the northern hemisphere and seemed to be greater the higher the latitude. This 
kind of a strategy required only two trades per year, so trading costs would not consume 
all profits. The results of Kamstra et al. (2003) are examined in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
Garrett, Kamstra & Kramer (2005) try to capture the SAD effect with a conditional 
version of the CAP-model that allows the price of risk to vary over time. This model is 
the model number four from chapter 2.3.1, presented originally by Bekaert et al. (1995). 
Their results suggest that the SAD effect is fully captured by this type of a model. This 
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discovery supports the previous hypothesis by Kamstra et al. (2003) by treating the SAD 
effect as a consequence of changes in risk aversion over time. 
 
SAD affecting stock returns has also spawned critique. Jacobsen et al. (2008) confirm the 
existence of a statistically significant seasonal effect, but they question the fact that it 
would be caused by SAD. They suggest that in future research a simple seasonal dummy 
is used instead of individual causes such as the SAD phenomenon or weather. They claim 
that stronger empirical and physiological evidence is needed to prove, what causes the 
changes in risk aversion.  
 
The research of Jacobsen et al. (2008) started a debate between them and Kamstra, 
Kramer and Levi. Kamstra, Kramer & Levi (2009) comment the research of Jacobsen et 
al. (2008) by criticizing their methodology and presenting several problems with their 
research. Kamstra et al. (2009) do admit that the SAD effect does not explain all of the 
variation in risk aversion, although they find it to be an important part of this variation.  
 
Jacobsen et al. (2009) publish a response to the comment of Kamstra et al. (2009). They 
explain the mistakes made in the original research by Jacobsen et al. (2008) and claim 
that the main point of the research, whether it is SAD that causes the seasonal pattern, 
still stands. Jacobsen et al. (2009) show that the seasonal variation on stock markets can 
be statistically significantly “explained” in several countries by other seasonal events, like 
the rise in ice cream consumption during the summer. Although, it is quite unlikely that 
ice cream consumption would actually explain stock returns in the real world, Jacobsen 
et al. (2009) make a good point about the necessity of further research concerning the link 
between stock returns and the SAD phenomenon. 
 
Keef et al. (2011) join the critics of the original research made by Kamstra et al. (2003). 
Keef et al. (2011) claim that the seasonal effect is significant, but cannot be explained by 
the depressed mood caused by SAD. Keef et al. (2011) also criticize some of the results 
used against Kamstra et al. (2003). They arrive to a similar conclusion with Jacobsen et 
al. (2009), which is that more research about the explanation behind the seasonal variation 
of stock returns is required. 
 
Kelly & Mesche (2009) critique the econometric and psychological evidence of the 
original study by Kamstra et al. (2003). Kelly et al. (2009) expand the original study and 
find results against SAD affecting the stock market. However, in one of their more recent 
papers, Kamstra, Kramer & Levi (2011) claim that Kelly et al. (2009) have misinterpreted 
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most of the psychological evidence they used to criticize Kamstra et al. (2003). Kamstra 
et al. (2011) also examine the econometric results of Kelly et al. (2009) and find them to 
strongly support the existence of the SAD phenomenon. Even though the research 
concerning SAD on the stock market has increased substantially after Kamstra et al. 
(2003), these mixed results and different conclusions call for further research and results 
concerning the phenomenon. 
 
 
4.1. Psychological and physiological background 
 
Partonen & Lönnqvist (1998) state that symptoms caused by the onset of SAD typically 
include social withdrawal, decreased activity, sadness, anxiety, lowered sex-drive, poor 
quality of sleep and increased appetite and weight. When SAD sufferers recover after 
winter solstice, their cognitive functions usually improve. Light therapy has also been 
documented to be an effective treatment for SAD. This supports the theory of decreasing 
daylight hours being the driver behind SAD.  
 
According to Rosenthal (1998: 3–4) 6 % of the US population suffer from SAD. 
Additionally, 14 % of the population suffer from a milder version of the disorder, which 
is often called the winter blues. Rosen, Targum, Terman & Bryant et al. (1990) find that 
rate of SAD sufferers is significantly higher in northern latitudes in the US. The clinical 
features of SAD are consistent across different industrialized cultures (Partonen et al. 
1998). This might mean that people living in different countries even further north would 
be affected at least at the same rate, or even more. 
 
Magnusson (2000) makes an overview of the epidemiological studies concerning SAD. 
He finds that results of the concerning studies are somewhat scattered, for example the 
prevalence estimates of SAD ranged from 0 % to 9,7 %. The prevalence was greater at 
higher northern latitudes and varied across ethnic groups. However, Magnusson (2000) 
concludes that SAD is a relatively common disorder and for the general population its 
onset begins in September and depressive symptoms peak in winter. 
 
Even though Magnusson (2000) finds evidence of higher northern latitudes having higher 
prevalence of SAD, there is at least one exception. Magnusson et al. (1993) examine the 
phenomenon in Iceland. Despite being far up in the North, the prevalence of SAD was 
found to be only 3,80 %, which is significantly lower than for example in the USA. Cott 
& Hibbeln (2001) explain the low prevalence of SAD in Iceland by much larger 
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consumption of fish compared to other Nordic countries and the US. They claim that 
Omega 3, and other fatty acids that fish contain, lower not only the SAD induced 
depression, but also depression in general.  For this reason Icelandic stock markets are 
studied in this thesis as a comparison to the other Nordic markets. 
  
The carrying theme of this thesis is the effect that SAD has on risk aversion. Eisenberg et 
al. (1998) experiment with people suffering from different degrees of depression. Risk 
aversion was distinguished from passivity by changing risky and safe choices to be the 
action requiring one. They find significant correlation between depressive symptoms and 
risk aversion.  
 
In the same fashion, Stanton, Reeck, Huettel & LaBar (2014) find that happy mood 
increases the gambling propensity of individuals. They induced happy, sad or neutral 
mood in the test subjects and had them make economic decisions with certain and risky 
payoffs. Inducing happy mood in subjects increased their likelihood to choose the risky 
choice, while no change in gambling frequency was found for subjects induced with sad 
or neutral mood. The increased preference of the risky choice can be interpreted as 
lowered risk aversion, which is in line with the findings of Eisenberg et al. (1998).  
 
One of the more recent psychological studies about SAD affecting financial risk aversion 
is made by Kramer et al. (2012). They conduct a survey for 5000 SAD sufferers and non-
SAD sufferers. The survey is carried out with real financial payoffs. As presented in 
figure 3, Kramer et al. (2012) find that SAD-sufferers move to less risky choices in the 
same rate as their depression scores rise. Noteworthy of this study is that it was made 
under extreme financial circumstances from summer 2008 to summer 2009. Even though 
the second summer of the study displays a relatively small drop on risk aversion for SAD 
sufferers, one can see that SAD sufferers change their risk preferences much more 
aggressively than non-SAD sufferers, when moving from summer to winter. The upward 
curve of non-SAD sufferers risk aversion is likely to be explained by the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. 
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Figure 3. Seasonal fluctuations in depression score and financial risk aversion over time (Kramer 
et al. 2012). 
 
 
4.2. Effects on the financial markets 
 
In their original study Kamstra et al. (2003) examine four indices from the US and eight 
indices from around the world. The foreign indices are from Sweden, Britain, Germany, 
Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Australia and South Africa. Figure 4 presents the monthly 
mean daily returns of the indices grouping them into the average of the US indices and 
the average of the foreign indices. Before calculating the average, the results from 
southern hemisphere are shifted by six months to align the seasons. It can be observed 
from figure 4 that September, which is the beginning of the onset of SAD for the general 
population, has the lowest returns in both groups. The highest returns are in turn found in 
January, the month after winter solstice. 
 
31 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Annual and monthly means of daily returns in the US (left) and foreign countries (right) 
(Kamstra et al. 2003). 
 
 
Kamstra et al. (2003) test a trading strategy, where an investor invests his/her whole 
portfolio in Swedish and Australian stock markets for 20 years starting from the early 
1980s. The idea is to be long on the Swedish stock market for the northern hemispheres 
fall and winter and move to the Australian market for the southern hemispheres fall and 
winter. This SAD-based strategy outperformed a neutral strategy, in which the investor 
holds both markets with equal proportions for the whole period, by an annual average of 
7,9 percent points. An opposite strategy, where the investor would have been long on the 
markets in an opposite fashion, would have underperformed the neutral strategy annually 
by 8,0 percent points. Kamstra et al. (2003) also find that the SAD-based strategy does 
not cause extra risk, at least in the form of volatility of returns. 
 
Kaplanski & Levy (2009) examine the seasonal variation of the VIX-index. The VIX-
index measures implied volatility derived from the prices of options. It is often called the 
fear index, because it is the estimate of the future volatility of risky assets (Whaley 2000). 
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Kaplanski et al. (2009) find a seasonal pattern on the VIX-index, which behaves 
according to the SAD phenomenon. Investors perceived risk peaks, when daylight hours 
decrease. This supports the theory of people moving out of risky assets during the onset 
of SAD. However, Kaplanski et al. (2009) find that the effect can only be found 
significant in perceived risk, not the actual market risk measured by volatility. This 
suggests that risk adjusted excess returns could be available, if actual risk and the risk 
that investors experience differ. 
 
Kaplanski, Levy, Veld & Veld-Merkoulova (2015) find further evidence of SAD 
affecting investor expectations. They study investor sentiment by examining a broad 
group of Dutch investors. They find the return expectations of SAD sufferers for the 
Dutch and the US markets to be significantly lower in the fall compared to other seasons. 
A SAD variable ranging from 1 to 4 depending on the severity of SAD is also found to 
be correlated to the mood of the whole sample. 
 
If investors move to less risky securities, when days shorten, the effect should also be 
visible in the less risky asset classes. Kamstra, Kramer & Levi (2014) examine the 
seasonal changes in the returns of US treasury bills, which are commonly thought of as a 
risk free asset. They find an opposite pattern than the one found on equities. US treasury 
bills seem to yield higher returns during the fall, up to 80 basis points in October 
compared to April. Kamstra et al. (2014) control for several possible explanations behind 
this difference and find that a proxy for seasonal variation in risk aversion explains over 
60 % of the difference. 
 
The effect of SAD can also improve correct pricing on the markets. Dolvin, Pyles & Wu 
(2009) find that SAD affects stock analysts’ earnings estimates. Analysts tend to be more 
pessimistic on estimates made during SAD months. However, analysts have been found 
to be generally too optimistic (for example, see Lim 2001). The increased pessimism 
therefore offsets an existing positive bias in analysts’ estimates and makes them more 
accurate as a whole. Dolvin et al. (2009) also find that the effect of SAD is significant 
with analysts from the northern states of the US, but not with those from southern ones. 
 
Pyles (2009) examines the effects of SAD on the returns of publicly traded real estate 
investment trusts (REITs). He finds results similar to the ones found from overall markets 
by, for example, Kamstra et al. (2003). The same seasonal effect as in normal equities is, 
however, only found in the smallest 40 % of REITs. According to Pyles (2009) this is to 
be expected, because the returns of REITs are easier to predict compared to normal stocks 
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and thus entail less risk. Smaller REITs are closer to normal equities considering risk and 
it is logical that the seasonal effect similar to normal equities is found in them.  
 
Another interesting finding by Pyles (2009) is that even though institutional investors 
were allowed on the REIT market after 1993, the influence of SAD does not disappear. 
Pyles (2009) gives three potential explanations for the influence to remain in an 
environment, where returns are largely driven by institutional investors, who are (or 
should be) financial professionals. First, there can be an undefined component on fall and 
winter returns driven by institutional investors. Second, a large percentage of non-
institutional investors are affected by seasonal depression. Third, institutional managers 
are not immune to psychological biases such as seasonal depression. The second of these 
explanations seems unlikely, when several medical professionals have documented that 
only a small part of the general population suffers from diagnosed seasonal depression 
like SAD (see for example Magnusson 2000). The third explanation, however, would 
seem plausible, because of the SAD effect Dolvin et al. (2009) find on financial analysts, 
who are also financial professionals. 
 
Kliger, Gurevich & Haim (2012) find that the calendar date of an IPO and its respective 
seasonal mood influence the returns of IPOs substantially in both the short and the long 
run. The difference between excess returns of IPOs issued in “depressing” and “cheerful” 
days is 5–10 % of the offering. The effect seems to be even stronger with companies that 
are less publicly exposed. Kliger et al. (2012) attribute these seasonal mood related effects 
to the lack of trading history, which they find to serve as an anchor in the valuation process 
(see also point 7 in appendix 1). Dolvin & Fernhaber (2014) also find results that support 
SAD influencing IPO underpricing. They find that younger firms suffer from even 
heavier underpricing during SAD periods, which is consistent with the findings of Kliger 
et al. (2012), if younger firms are thought of as the less publicly exposed ones. According 
to Dolvin et al. (2014), this effect can be mitigated by using a higher quality underwriter 
or changing the share retention decision. 
 
The effect of SAD has also been linked to the post earnings announcement drift. Lin 
(2015) finds smaller immediate response of investors to earnings news during the time of 
lowest daylight hours. SAD does not seem to have an effect on the negative earnings 
surprises, but it causes stronger immediate effects to positive earnings surprises during 
the winter and weaker in the fall. Similar behavior can be found in abnormal trading 
volumes for positive earnings surprises. The three-day abnormal volume is lower during 
the fall and higher during the winter, but negative surprises do not seem to be effected. 
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Lin (2015) proposes that the fact that negative earnings surprises are not affected results 
from an “Ostrich effect”, where people try to avoid hearing bad news, when they are 
likely. This behavior can be thought to be somewhat linked to the point five of appendix 
1, Belief perseverance.  
 
Kaustia & Rantapuska (2015) study the effects of mood on trading behavior of investors. 
Their data consists of about 1.2 million individual Finnish investors and about 45 000 
Finnish institutions. They find SAD to have a relatively little effect on the tendency to 
buy and sell, but trading volume seems to be affected positively. The clearest patterns 
they find during the summer holiday season. Trading volume is lower and investors seem 
to sell more. This supports the vacation explanation behind the Halloween effect 
presented by Bouman et al. (2002). Even though Kaustia et al. (2015) have a large amount 
of data, one has to bear in mind that the results are from a small country with a relatively 
small stock market. 
 
Kamstra, Kramer, Levi & Wermers (2013) publish a working paper, where they find 
seasonal flows of capital in mutual funds in the US, Canada and Australia. These seasonal 
flows seem to behave as the SAD caused change in risk aversion would suggest. The 
flows are economically significant containing tens of billions of dollars. The paper does 
not examine returns of mutual funds, but according to its results, studying the seasonal 
returns of funds with different risk levels would seem beneficial. 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This thesis studies the effect of the SAD phenomenon on nine indices in five countries. 
For each country, excluding Iceland, an index consisting of the most traded companies 
and an index consisting of the smallest companies is examined. These indices are OMX 
Helsinki 25 Price Index and OMX Helsinki Small Cap Price Index for Finland, OMX 
Stockholm 30 Price Index and OMX Stockholm Small Cap Price Index for Sweden, OMX 
Copenhagen 20 Price Index and OMX Copenhagen Small Cap Price Index for Denmark, 
Oslo SE OBX Price Index and Oslo Exchange Small Cap Total Return Index for Norway 
and OMX Iceland All-Share Price Index for Iceland.  
 
The choice to use price indices is based on the substantially longer history and resulting 
larger amount of observations. An exception to this had to be made for Norwegian small 
cap companies because of data availability. Additionally, because of their longer 
histories, the indices of most traded companies are used instead of the actual large cap 
indices. Only one Icelandic index is studied in this thesis. The OMX Iceland All-Share 
Price Index was chosen to represent the stock market of the whole country, because it has 
the longest history of available data. Not being able to compare Icelandic large and small 
cap indices is not a problem, because Iceland is studied as a comparison to the other 
Nordic countries, because of its unique properties concerning SAD prevalence.  
 
All of the indices are value weighted and, with the exception of Oslo Exchange Small 
Cap Total Return Index, dividends are not included. Although, it would be more logical 
to examine total return indices that include dividends, the histories of the respective total 
return indices were so much shorter that the logical choice was to examine price indices. 
The data for all of the indices is obtained from Datastream, except for OMX Iceland All-
Share, which is obtained from the Nasdaq OMX Nordic website and Google Finance. 
 
 
5.1. Data description 
 
In this thesis daily returns, calculated as the difference of the natural logarithms of returns 
on time t and t-1, are used. The data is from as long as it is available in each case. The 
longest series is for OMX Stockholm 30 and the shortest for the small cap indices of 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark, as can be seen from table 1.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the raw data. All figures except skew and kurtosis are 
percentages. 
 
 
 
The average daily returns range from 0,049 % for OMXS Small Cap to 0,017 % for 
OMXC Small Cap. The standard deviations of daily returns are higher for large cap 
indices compared to their respective small cap indices, Oslo SE OBX being the most 
volatile at 1,50 %. The largest falls are experienced in Norway and Iceland. Oslo SE OBX 
fell 24,00 % during the Norwegian banking crisis in 1987. The OMXI All Share 
experienced a 36,63 % daily fall, when the trading restrictions of two large banks, Exista 
Hf and Straumur-Burðarás fjárfestingarbanki Hf, were removed in late 2008. The 
plummeting of two companies caused a fall of this magnitude, because the Icelandic stock 
market is rather small, and, especially before the financial crisis, concentrated on the 
banking sector. 
 
The minimum returns are lower for each large cap index compared to their respective 
small cap indices. In the same fashion, the maximum values are higher for the large cap 
indices. Even though one could initially think that small cap indices are more likely to 
Country Index Mean 
Stand. 
dev. Minimum Maximum Skew Kurtosis 
Finland OMXH25 0,027 1,46 -9,40 9,29 -0,15 6,72 
  3.5.1988-19.3.2015             
  OMXH Small Cap 0,032 0,78 -4,99 7,60 0,15 11,12 
  1.1.2003-19.3.2015             
Sweden OMXS30 0,039 1,43 -8,53 11,02 0,02 7,59 
  2.1.1986-19.3.2015             
  OMXS Small Cap 0,049 0,85 -7,12 7,01 -1,07 12,66 
  1.1.2003-19.3.2015             
Denmark OMXC20 0,032 1,15 -11,72 9,50 -0,29 9,20 
  4.12.1989-19.3.2015             
  OMXC Small Cap 0,017 0,63 -6,30 4,25 -0,98 12,98 
  1.1.2003-19.3.2015             
Norway Oslo SE OBX 0,028 1,50 -24,00 11,12 -1,00 18,99 
  2.1.1987-19.3.2015             
  Oslo SE Small Cap 0,036 1,02 -7,52 5,72 -0,91 9,32 
  1.1.1996-19.3.2015             
Iceland OMXI All Share 0,026 1,15 -36,63 5,06 -10,25 302,60 
 5.1.2001-19.3.2015       
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have higher extreme values, those being higher for the large cap indices is not abnormal, 
because they have a larger set of observations.  
 
Most indices are negatively skewed, which is typical for stock markets, but, interestingly, 
OMXH Small Cap and OMXS 30 are positively skewed. All of the return series are also 
kurtotic, OMXH 25 having the lowest kurtosis at 6,72. OMX Iceland All-Share has 
distinctly the highest kurtosis at 302,60, followed by Oslo SE OBX at 18,99. The extreme 
level of the kurtosis in Iceland is likely to be caused by the low amount of extreme values. 
Even though the minimum value of the Icelandic returns is lowest of all of the Nordic 
countries, the amount of these extreme values does not seem to be extensive, and the 
majority of the observations are likely to be concentrated. 
 
 
5.2. Hypotheses 
 
There are two hypotheses that are tested in this thesis. The first one addresses the main 
question of the thesis, if SAD is a factor behind the seasonal pattern in stock returns. The 
first hypothesis and its alternative hypothesis are defined as: 
 
(1) H0: Seasonal affective disorder does not affect stock returns. 
 H1: Seasonal affective disorder affects stock returns. 
 
The second hypothesis is used to examine the potential effect that SAD has on stock 
returns further. It tests, if the effects of SAD are symmetrical in fall and winter. This 
aspect is examined to find out that alongside with the length of night, does the direction 
it is moving affect stock returns. The second hypothesis and its alternative hypothesis are 
defined as: 
 
(2) H0: The effects of SAD are symmetrical between fall and winter. 
 H1: The effects of SAD are asymmetrical between fall and winter. 
 
These hypotheses are tested for each index, using the variables defined in subchapter 5.3. 
The acceptances and rejections of the hypotheses are talked over alongside with the 
results of the regressions in chapter 6. 
 
 
38 
 
5.3. Methodology 
 
This thesis examines the effect of SAD on Nordic stock markets using single regressions 
for each index. The main explanatory variable analyzed is the length of the night in the 
fall and winter relative to the mean annual length of night, which is 12 hours. Following 
Kamstra et al. (2003), this variable SADt is defined as: 
 
   Ht – 12, for trading days in the fall and the winter 
 (6) SADt =  
   0, otherwise 
 
Where Ht is the time from sunset to sunrise in a particular location at time t. Ht is defined 
using standard approximations from spherical trigonometry. In order to calculate the 
number of hours of night at latitude δ, the sun’s declination angle λt is required. 
 
 (7) λt = 0,4102*sin[(2π/365)(juliant – 80,25)] 
 
Where juliant represents the number of the day in the year ranging from 1 to 365. It equals 
1 for the first of January, 2 for the second of January and so forth. After obtaining the 
declination angle, the number of hours of night in the Northern Hemisphere can be 
calculated as: 
 
 (8) Ht = 24 – 7,72*arccos[-tan(2πδ/360)tan(λt)] 
 
Where arccos is the arc cosine. 
 
Results of Palinkas, Houseal & Rosenthal (1996) and Palinkas & Houseal (2000) suggest 
that the depressive effect of SAD may be asymmetric around winter solstice. This 
asymmetricity is the idea behind SAD affecting stock markets. The risk aversion of SAD 
sufferers increases, when daylight hours decrease. These same people would then 
increase their risk taking, when daylight hours start to increase. Therefore, the SAD effect 
should be allowed to be asymmetric in the fall and the winter. This can be achieved by 
introducing a fall dummy Dt
fall, for days of the year in the fall. 
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   1, for trading days in the fall 
 (9) Dt
fall =   
0, otherwise 
 
Trading days in the fall are from fall equinox (22.9.)  to winter solstice (19.12.) each year. 
This dummy variable allows the SAD effect to differ between fall and winter. However, 
the differing is not required. If the coefficient of this variable proves to be insignificant, 
the effects are symmetric between the two periods. 
 
Finally, following Kamstra et al. (2003), the regression is defined as follows: 
 
(10) rt = β0 + ρ1rt-1 + ρ2rt-2 + β1SADt + β2Dtfall + β3Dtmonday + β4Dttax 
+ εt 
 
Where, 
 rt = The logarithmic period t return of an index. 
  
 ρ1rt-1 & ρ2rt-2 = Lagged dependent variables. Used where necessary to 
control for residual autocorrelation. 
 
 SADt = The SAD variable. Defined as explained in equation 6. 
 
 Dt
fall = Fall dummy. Defined as explained in equation 9. 
 
 Dt
monday = A dummy variable, which equals 1, when period t is the first 
trading day of the week and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Dt
tax = A dummy variable, which equals 1, when period t is the last trading 
day or one of the five first trading days of the year and 0 otherwise. 
 
 εt  = The error term 
 
Monday and tax-loss dummies are included, because they are known calendar anomalies 
overlapping the SAD phenomenon. It is especially important to control for tax-loss 
trading, because for most of the countries returns seem to peak in January. 
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Kamstra et al. (2003) also use cloud cover, precipitation and temperature as explanatory 
variables. Garret et al. (2005) omit these variables, when testing their version of the 
regression, because they are relatively insignificant. For the same reason, cloud cover, 
precipitation and temperature are not used in this thesis. 
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6. RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter examines the results of the regressions for each country. The results are 
presented one country at a time in their respective subchapters. This approach was chosen 
to make comparing the SAD effect between large and small companies easier. The 
countries and large cap and small cap indices are compared to each other in subchapter 
6.6.  
 
Statistical significance of the coefficients is measured with the heteroscedasticity robust 
t-values of White (1980). Autocorrelation is controlled for by including one or two lagged 
dependent variables where necessary. 
 
 
6.1. Finland 
 
As can be seen from table 2, SAD is significant on the 1 % level for OMXH25 and on the 
5 % level for OMXH Small Cap. Interestingly, the effect seems to be symmetrical for 
OMXH25, since the fall dummy is not significant. OMXH Small Cap on the other hand 
seems to experience an asymmetrical effect, since its fall dummy is significant on a 1 % 
level.  
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Table 2. Regression results for stock indices in Helsinki. The results are presented as percentage 
points, excluding the R2 coefficient. Statistical significance is measured with Whites 
heteroscedasticity robust t-values. The latitude of the city can be seen after the city’s name. 
 
HELSINKI (60°10') 
Variable OMXH25 t OMXHSCAP t 
ρ1 0,058 3,31 0,121 3,92 
ρ2 - - 0,075 2,77 
Dmonday -0,045 -1,00 -0,020 -0,51 
Dtax 0,114 0,81 0,368 2,65 
Dfall -0,056 -1,11 -0,105 -2,94 
SAD 0,022 2,67 0,014 2,18 
         
R2 0,0052   0,0392   
 
 
The results contain some interesting properties. For example, the prices of large Finnish 
companies do not seem to rise slower in the fall compared to winter. Then again, the 
appreciation of small cap companies seems to be stronger after winter solstice compared 
to the fall period. This is suggested by the statistically significant negative fall dummy in 
OMXH Small Cap. Alongside with having the highest t-value of the Finnish data, the 
absolute value of the coefficient is farthest from zero of the Finnish results. 
 
Other dummy variables are insignificant, with the exception of the tax dummy for the 
OMXH Small Cap. This suggest that prices of large Finnish companies are not affected 
by tax loss trading, but small companies are. This seems logical, because of the lower 
volume of trades. There is also no observable Monday effect in either of the Finnish 
indices. 
 
The regressions are able to explain 0,52 % of the returns of OMXH25 and 3,92 % of the 
returns of OMXH Small Cap. Based on the results above, for hypothesis 1, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for both OMXH25 and OMXH Small cap and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted. For hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is accepted for OMXH25 
and rejected for OMXH Small cap. The effect of SAD on returns of Finnish stocks can 
therefore be considered symmetrical for large companies and asymmetrical for small 
companies.  
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6.2. Sweden 
 
The results from Sweden are similar to results from Finland with some exceptions. As 
can be seen from table 3, SAD is significant on the 1 % level for both OMXS30 and 
OMXS Small cap. The fall dummies are also significant, on the 5 % level for OMXS30 
and on the 1 % level for OMXS Small Cap. This suggests that the SAD effect is 
asymmetrical in Sweden both in large and small companies. 
 
 
Table 3. Regression results for stock indices in Stockholm. The results are presented as 
percentage points, excluding the R2 coefficient. Statistical significance is measured with Whites 
heteroscedasticity robust t-values. The latitude of the city can be seen after the city’s name. 
 
STOCKHOLM (59°17') 
Variable OMXS30 t OMXSSCAP t 
ρ1 0,023 1,30 0,104 2,51 
ρ2 - - 0,078 2,10 
Dmonday -0,023 -0,51 -0,071 -1,59 
Dtax -0,012 -0,10 0,102 0,96 
Dfall -0,104 -2,08 -0,123 -2,87 
SAD 0,022 2,68 0,028 4,09 
          
R2 0,0018   0,0289   
 
 
The coefficients are in general higher than those of Finland in table 2. The coefficient of 
SAD in OMXS Small Cap is higher than the SAD coefficient of OMXS30. In the same 
fashion as in Finnish results, the coefficients of the fall dummies are higher than the 
coefficients of SAD. Other dummy variables prove to be insignificant for both Swedish 
indices. Therefore no tax loss effect or Monday effect is detected in Sweden. 
 
The regressions explain 0,18 % of the returns of OMXS30 and 2,89 % of the returns of 
OMXS Small Cap. For hypothesis 1, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted for both indices. The null hypothesis of hypothesis 2 is also 
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rejected for OMXS30 and OMXS Small Cap. The effect of SAD can therefore be found 
significant and asymmetrical for both indices. 
 
 
6.3. Denmark 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions from Denmark. OMXC Small Cap is the 
first index of the study, where SAD is found to be insignificant. However, the fall dummy 
is significant for OMXC Small Cap. For OMXC20, SAD and the fall dummy are both 
significant. The level of SAD coefficient of OMXC20 is close to the levels of SAD 
coefficients of the large cap indices of Finland and Sweden. 
 
 
Table 4. Regression results for stock indices in Copenhagen. The results are presented as 
percentage points, excluding the R2 coefficient. Statistical significance is measured with Whites 
heteroscedasticity robust t-values. The latitude of the city can be seen after the city’s name. 
 
COPENHAGEN (55°40') 
Variable OMXC20 t OMXCSCAP t 
ρ1 0,058 2,83 0,156 4,17 
ρ2 - - 0,114 3,41 
Dmonday -0,023 -0,59 0,003 0,10 
Dtax 0,143 1,40 0,290 3,55 
Dfall -0,088 -2,07 -0,087 -2,73 
SAD 0,022 2,63 0,006 0,92 
          
R2 0,0059   0,0591   
 
 
The tax-loss dummy is significant on the 1 % level for OMXC Small Cap. The 
significance and the coefficient are also highest of the Danish results. Other additional 
dummy variables turn out to be insignificant. Tax loss effect is therefore detected in 
OMXC Small Cap, while no such effect can be found in OMXC20. Monday effect is not 
detected in either of the indices.  
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The regressions are able to explain 0,59 % of the returns of OMXC20 and 5,91 % of the 
returns of OMXC Small Cap. For hypothesis 1, the null hypothesis is rejected on the 1 % 
level and the alternative hypothesis is accepted for OMXC20. For OMXC Small Cap, the 
null hypothesis is accepted and therefore SAD is not a factor behind its returns. For 
hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is rejected on the 5 % level for OMXC20 and the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, SAD effect is asymmetrical for OMXC20. 
For OMXC Small Cap, SAD effect is not found. It seems to, however, experience lower 
than average returns in the autumn.  
 
 
6.4. Norway 
 
It can be seen from table 5 that SAD is significant and positive for both Oslo OBX and 
Oslo Small Cap. The fall dummies are also significant, and negative, which suggests an 
asymmetrical SAD effect for both indices. The coefficients of SAD and the fall dummies 
in Norway are highest of the Nordic indices. 
 
Monday dummy is significant and negative on the 1 % level for Oslo Small Cap. For Oslo 
OBX the Monday dummy is not significant. Tax dummies are also not statistically 
significant for either Norwegian indices. The regression is able to explain 0,48 % of the 
returns of Oslo OBX and 2,99 % of the returns of Oslo Small Cap. 
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Table 5. Regression results for stock indices in Oslo. The results are presented as percentage 
points, excluding the R2 coefficient. Statistical significance is measured with Whites 
heteroscedasticity robust t-values. The latitude of the city can be seen after the city’s name. 
 
OSLO (59°57') 
Variable OSLO OBX t OSLO SCAP t 
ρ1 0,029 1,01 0,121 4,77 
ρ2 -0,031 -1,42 0,071 3,18 
Dmonday -0,089 -1,86 -0,100 -2,63 
Dtax 0,105 0,85 0,141 1,23 
Dfall -0,167 -3,05 -0,123 -2,90 
SAD 0,025 2,98 0,026 3,79 
          
R2 0,0048   0,0299   
 
 
Based on the above results, the null hypotheses of hypothesis 1 are rejected on the 1 % 
level and the alternative hypotheses are accepted for both indices. SAD is therefore found 
to be a factor behind the returns of both indices. The fall dummies are also significant on 
the 1 % level. Hence, the null hypotheses for hypothesis 2 are rejected and the alternative 
hypotheses are accepted for both indices. The SAD effect is therefore found to be 
asymmetrical for both indices. The effect of SAD and the asymmetricity of the effect in 
Norway are highest of the studied countries. 
 
 
6.5. Iceland 
 
Table 6 shows that results from Iceland behave in a manner that the low prevalence of 
SAD would suggest. The coefficient of SAD and the fall dummy prove to be statistically 
insignificant. This supports the theory that SAD induced mood swings are a factor behind 
the seasonal anomaly in stock returns. The tax loss dummy is also statistically 
insignificant, but the Monday dummy is significant on the 1 % level. 
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Table 6. Regression results for OMX All Share Iceland. The results are presented as percentage 
points, excluding the R2 coefficient. Statistical significance is measured with Whites 
heteroscedasticity robust t-values. The latitude of the city can be seen after the city’s name. 
 
REYKJAVIK (64°10') 
Variable OMXIPI t 
ρ1 0,083 4,80 
ρ2 0,068 3,94 
Dmonday -0,186 -3,63 
Dtax 0,129 0,59 
Dfall -0,094 -1,77 
SAD 0,005 0,68 
      
R2 0,0175   
 
 
 The null hypotheses of both hypotheses are accepted and the alternative hypotheses 
rejected. Therefore no SAD effect, asymmetrical or symmetrical, can be found in the 
Icelandic stock market. The regression is able to explain 1,75 % of the returns in the OMX 
Iceland All-Share. 
 
 
6.6. Comparing results 
 
The results of the large cap indices of the countries are remarkably similar. As can be 
seen from table 7, Oslo has the highest coefficient at 0,025 %, while the other large cap 
coefficients are all 0,022 %. Additionally, there are no notable differences in the statistical 
significances of these coefficients, all being significant on the 1 % level.  
 
The coefficients of the small cap indices are less in line compared to the coefficients of 
the large cap indices. As table 7 shows, the significant coefficients range from 0,014 % 
in Helsinki to 0,028 % in Stockholm. The only statistically insignificant SAD coefficient 
of the studied indices (apart from Iceland) is found in the Danish small cap index.  
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Table 7. SAD coefficients for each index compiled from the regression results. The coefficients 
are significant on the 1 % level, with the exceptions of the coefficient of Helsinki Small cap index, 
which is significant on the 5 % level, and the coefficient of the Copenhagen Small cap index, 
which is not statistically significant. The coefficients are presented as percentage points. 
 
City and latitude Large Cap Small Cap 
Helsinki  
(60°10') 0,022 0,014 
Stockholm 
(59°17') 0,022 0,028 
Copenhagen 
(55°40') 0,022 (0,006) 
Oslo  
(59°57') 0,025 0,026 
 
 
The results do not suggest that the effect of SAD is in general higher among smaller 
companies compared to larger ones. In Stockholm and Oslo the coefficients of the small 
cap indices are higher than those of the large cap indices, but the differences are small, 
0,006 and 0,001 percentage points respectively. In turn, the coefficient of the Helsinki 
large cap index is 0,008 percentage points higher than the coefficient of the local small 
cap index.  
 
When the insignificance of the coefficient of the Copenhagen small cap index is taken 
into account along with the differences presented above, no clear argument can be made 
about the SAD effect being stronger with small cap companies. If anything, the 
consistency of the large cap results might be considered as proof of a stronger SAD effect 
among large companies. However, there is not enough evidence to make claims towards 
either direction. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis studies the effect of SAD on stock returns of Nordic countries. Even though 
the whole concept of SAD affecting stock returns would seem like a psychological bias, 
it can also be thought to be within the boundaries of the efficient market theory. The 
conditions of market efficiency are not necessarily broken, if the risk aversion of investors 
is included in financial models, and it is allowed to change through time. From this 
perspective, the SAD effect appears to be in an interesting crossroads between the 
efficient market theory and behavioral finance. 
 
Previous research is somewhat controversial about the role of SAD affecting the returns 
on stock markets. It has been possible to earn risk adjusted excess returns with a SAD 
based strategy in several different markets. Furthermore, unlike most calendar anomalies, 
the profits of a SAD based strategy would not be consumed by transaction costs. 
However, there is a body of research that questions the assumption that SAD is the driver 
behind this seasonal pattern of stock returns. It is likely that the discussion concerning the 
seasonal pattern in stock returns and the effect of SAD will remain heated until a cause 
for the pattern is proven more thoroughly. Proving powerfully that it is SAD above other 
reasons that causes the pattern would require a large amount of data of the individual 
trades of individual investors. It is of course also possible, and even likely, that the pattern 
consists of many factors, including the ones presented in this thesis, and cannot be 
attributed to a single factor. 
 
The results obtained from Nordic countries support the theory of SAD being a factor 
behind the seasonal variation of stock returns. SAD is found to be significant for all 
studied indices from Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway with the exception of the 
Danish small cap index. The magnitude of the effect is remarkably similar among the 
large cap indices of different Nordic countries, ranging from 0,025 % for Norway to 0,022 
% for Finland, Sweden and Denmark. For small cap indices, the effect is not as consistent. 
The strongest SAD effect found in this thesis is in Swedish small cap companies, 0,028 
%. On the other hand, the effect is found to be insignificant in Danish small cap 
companies and lowest of the significant coefficients is found in Finnish small cap 
companies, 0,014 %. Therefore no argument can be made for a stronger SAD effect 
among smaller companies. 
 
50 
 
The SAD effect found in these indices is also asymmetrical, with the exception of 
OMXH25, the Finnish large cap index. This means that the amount of hours of darkness 
are a factor behind the returns of large Finnish companies, but the effect is symmetrical 
between fall and winter. Therefore, for large Finnish companies, there is no difference in 
the SAD effect between days with same amount of hours of darkness in the fall and 
winter. Then again, for the other studied indices, the effect is asymmetrical. This means 
that it is not the amount of hours of darkness alone that affects the returns, but also the 
direction of the change in the length of night. 
 
Reykjavik stock exchange is the northernmost stock exchange in the world, but the 
prevalence of SAD is documented to be significantly lower in Iceland compared to, for 
example, the US and the other Nordic countries. When this low prevalence of SAD in 
Iceland is considered, the results obtained from OMX Iceland All-Share should not come 
as a surprise. The fact that the SAD variable does not explain returns in Iceland 
corroborates the theory of SAD explaining the seasonal pattern of stock returns. 
 
All things considered the findings of this thesis contribute to existing research by finding 
a SAD effect from the stock markets of Nordic countries, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway, where SAD is found to be more prevalent. Additionally, the size of a company 
does not seem to have an effect on the magnitude of the SAD effect in the Nordic 
countries. Even though the highest value for a SAD coefficient was found in OMXS Small 
Cap, the results from large cap indices were more consistent. One potential reason behind 
higher consistency of the large cap results might be foreign institutional investors, who 
invest in large cap companies in all Nordic countries. If these investors were suffering 
from SAD, or some other factor the SAD variable captures, the consistency of the results 
among large cap indices could be expected. 
 
Taking advantage of the SAD effect on stock markets is not as simple as some of the 
previous research might suggest. Following a SAD based strategy would not increase 
conventional risk measures like volatility. However, if an investor would want to take 
advantage of the pattern, he/she would have to bear the risk of the anomaly disappearing 
or reverting itself. In fact, an interesting question is, why have arbitrageurs not taken 
advantage of this pattern of returns and made it disappear. At least a part of the reason 
might be that actions of financial professionals are not necessarily immune to seasonal 
depression. Another reason might be the fact that there are other factors, which have been 
suggested to cause the pattern. Potential arbitrageurs might not want to act without exact 
evidence of the cause of the pattern. 
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This lack of hard evidence is hard to overcome, even with the rather large amount of 
results favoring SAD as the cause of the seasonal pattern in stock returns obtained in 
previous research as well as this thesis. It is naturally possible that the commonly used 
SAD variable, due to its seasonal characteristics, captures a seasonal anomaly, which is 
actually caused by some other factor. However, with the psychological evidence 
presented earlier, SAD affecting stock returns seems relatively logical. Furthermore, the 
competing theories that explain the seasonal variation of stock returns, like the Halloween 
effect, also suffer from the same proving difficulties as the SAD effect.  
 
Although several different financial securities and different markets have already been 
studied, many interesting topics remain. An interesting topic for research would be the 
returns of mutual funds of different risk levels. The funds with no institutional 
stakeholders could be chosen to test for a seasonal effect among retail (non-professional) 
investors. On the other hand, institutional investors could also be examined, because there 
are results, which suggest that they are not necessarily immune to seasonal changes in 
risk aversion.  
 
Other fascinating subject of research would be currencies. If investors suffer from 
seasonal changes in risk aversion also in the currency market, it should be visible in the 
rates of safe haven currencies like the US Dollar and the Swiss Franc. It might also be 
interesting to study the prices of different derivatives through the seasons. Their price 
changes would provide beforehand information about investors’ expectations concerning 
the pattern. Prices of equity index futures and options with maturities in fall and winter 
would reveal, if the effect is expected, at least to some degree. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1. Psychological biases by Barberis et al. (2003): 
 
1. Overconfidence: Overconfidence presents itself in two ways. People assign far too 
narrow confidence intervals. They are also generally bad at estimating probabilities. For 
example, events they estimate to be certain only occur 80 % of the time and events they 
estimate to be impossible occur 20 % of the time. 
 
2. Optimism and wishful thinking: People tend to have unrealistic views of their own 
abilities. For example, 90 % of people think they are above average drivers. 
 
3. Representativeness: People suffer from base rate neglect and sample size neglect. Base 
rate neglect causes people to be led by the way a question is presented. They have been 
documented to jump into conclusions based on their own experiences without any support 
from the concerning data. Sample size neglect means that people trust small sample sizes 
too much. People can, for example, put equal weight to a coin toss of three heads and 
three tails and a coin toss of 500 heads and 500 tails. Sample size neglect is sometimes 
called “the law of small numbers”. 
 
4. Conservatism: People move too conservatively from base rates. This appears to conflict 
with representativeness, but that is not the case. If the data has an underlying model, 
people seem to overweight the data. However, if there is no model, people lean on their 
priors and react too little. 
 
5. Belief perseverance: People tend to hold on to their opinions too tight and for too long. 
They are reluctant to search evidence that is in conflict with their view and if they happen 
to find such information, they are likely to treat it with extensive skepticism. A stronger 
version of belief perseverance is confirmation bias, where people misinterpret evidence 
that contradicts their hypothesis. 
 
6. Anchoring: People adjust away from initial values too slowly. For example, people 
were asked in an experiment if the percentage of African countries in the UN was higher 
or lower than a randomly generated number between 0 and 100. The given initial value 
was found to affect their estimates significantly.  
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7. Availability biases: People put too much weight on their own experiences, when 
estimating probabilities. They also weigh recent events more heavily. 
 
 
